Deep Dive: Sudan's Ambassador to African Union Calls for Classifying Rapid Support Forces as Terrorist Group

Sudan's Ambassador to the African Union (AU), the continental organization headquartered in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, that promotes unity and solidarity among African states, has formally demanded the classification of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a powerful paramilitary group in Sudan, as a terrorist organization. This move reflects the Sudanese government's strategic effort to delegitimize the RSF amid the devastating civil war that erupted in April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the RSF commanded by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti). Historically, the RSF evolved from the Janjaweed militias, notorious for atrocities during the Darfur genocide in the early 2000s, and was formalized in 2013 as a border guard force under former President Omar al-Bashir, gaining significant autonomy and economic interests in gold mining and other resources. From a geopolitical lens, this diplomatic push at the AU level underscores Sudan's bid to isolate the RSF internationally, potentially unlocking AU sanctions, travel bans, or asset freezes similar to those applied to groups like Boko Haram or Al-Shabaab. Key actors include the AU Commission, chaired by Moussa Faki Mahamat, which has repeatedly called for ceasefires but struggled with enforcement; regional powers like Egypt (backing SAF for Nile water security) and the UAE (accused of arming RSF for Red Sea influence); and global players such as Russia (via Wagner Group ties to RSF gold trade) and Saudi Arabia (mediating via Jeddah talks). Culturally, in Sudan's diverse society—spanning Arab-Muslim north, African-Christian south, and non-Arab Darfur tribes—this framing taps into narratives of state sovereignty versus militia predation, resonating with AU's anti-terrorism protocols while risking perceptions of politicized labeling. Cross-border implications ripple through the Horn of Africa and Sahel: over 10 million Sudanese refugees strain neighbors like Chad, Egypt, and South Sudan, exacerbating famine risks certified by the UN; RSF advances toward Port Sudan threaten Red Sea shipping lanes critical for 12% of global trade; and splintering alliances could draw in Ethiopia (border tensions) or Libya (arms flows). Beyond the region, Western aid donors face dilemmas—classifying RSF as terrorists might streamline humanitarian corridors but complicate neutral mediation—while China and Russia leverage the vacuum for mineral access. The outlook hinges on AU's response: endorsement could tip momentum to SAF, but rejection might embolden RSF offensives, prolonging a war displacing 25% of Sudan's 48 million people and risking state collapse. This demand preserves nuance by not equating RSF solely with terrorism—acknowledging their role in ousting Bashir in 2019—yet highlights their alleged atrocities like Khartoum rapes and El Fasher sieges, per UN reports. Stakeholders' interests converge on stability: AU seeks credibility post-Mali coups, while diaspora communities in the UAE and Saudi Arabia push for intervention. Ultimately, this AU gambit tests pan-African institutions' efficacy in quelling Africa's deadliest conflict since the Rwandan genocide.