Deep Dive: Analysts say classifying Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan as terrorist group starts stalled negotiations forward

Sudan has been embroiled in political turmoil since the 2019 ouster of longtime leader Omar al-Bashir, leading to a power-sharing arrangement between civilians and the military that collapsed into conflict in 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) under Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti). The Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan), a transnational Islamist organization founded in Egypt in 1928, has historical roots in Sudan through affiliates like the National Islamic Front, which backed Bashir's regime and shaped Sharia-influenced governance. Classifying it as a terrorist entity aligns with regional trends, as Egypt, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain have done so since 2013 post-Muslim Brotherhood's brief rule there, viewing it as a threat to secular or monarchical stability. From a geopolitical lens, this designation by Sudan's SAF-dominated government signals a pivot toward Gulf allies like UAE and Egypt, who back Burhan against RSF supported by Wagner/now Africa Corps (Russia) and ideologically flexible Islamists. It pressures Brotherhood-linked factions in negotiation forums like Jeddah talks (US-Saudi mediated) or IGAD processes, potentially isolating them and forcing concessions on power-sharing or disarmament. Culturally, Sudan's diverse society—Arab-Muslim north vs. African-Christian/animist south, with Brotherhood appealing to urban Islamists—means this risks alienating conservative bases while rallying secular or tribal groups weary of Islamist dominance. Cross-border implications ripple through the Sahel and Horn of Africa: Egypt secures its border against instability spilling from Darfur; UAE strengthens anti-Islamist axis amid rivalry with Qatar/Turkey (Brotherhood backers); Chad and South Sudan face refugee surges if talks advance or fail. Humanitarian crises worsen with 10 million displaced, famine in Zamzam camp; global actors like UN, US (sanctions on RSF), EU (aid), and China (BRI ports) watch as prolonged war blocks Nile Waters deals or Red Sea trade. Outlook: If negotiations restart, it could yield SAF dominance but fragile peace; failure entrenches partition risks, benefiting jihadists like IS-Sahel. Key actors' interests: SAF seeks legitimacy via de-Islamization to attract Western aid; Brotherhood resists to preserve influence in post-war governance; external powers maneuver for bases/resources (gold, ports). This nuance avoids binary 'good vs evil' but highlights how domestic labeling serves as diplomatic leverage in a proxy-riddled civil war.